Within a fairly short amount of time, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has managed to put large swaths of land in Syria and Iraq under their control. To many observers, the sheer speed at which this "state" was established was dumbfounding. To better understand the roots of this organization and its supporters we present a study using data from Twitter. We start by collecting large amounts of Arabic tweets referring to ISIS and classify them into pro-ISIS and anti-ISIS. This classification turns out to be easily done simply using the name variants used to refer to the organization: the full name and the description as "state" is associated with support, whereas abbreviations usually indicate opposition. We then "go back in time" by analyzing the historic timelines of both users supporting and opposing and look at their pre-ISIS period to gain insights into the antecedents of support. To achieve this, we build a classifier using pre-ISIS data to "predict", in retrospect, who will support or oppose the group. The key story that emerges is one of frustration with failed Arab Spring revolutions. ISIS supporters largely differ from ISIS opposition in that they refer a lot more to Arab Spring uprisings that failed. We also find temporal patterns in the support and opposition which seems to be linked to major news, such as reported territorial gains, reports on gruesome acts of violence, and reports on airstrikes and foreign intervention.
Introduction
The recent rise and territorial gains of the "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria" (ISIS) (or simply the "Islamic State") has sparked significant interest in the group. One particular aspect of interest in ISIS is related to the profile of individuals who are likely to join or merely support them. Since the events of 9-11, there has been wide interest in identifying necessary and sufficient traits individuals may posses that are likely to propel them to support or join violent militant organizations. Contrary to popular belief, social psychology studies and reviews suggest that individuals who end up joining such organizations are typically more educated, financially better off, generally more accomplished than average, and more exposed to Western culture (Louis 2009 ). Many studies have looked at whether such individuals suffer from psychological disorders, but found no evidence of such (Horgan 2003) . On the contrary, they generCopyright c 2015, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
ally exhibit higher than average psychological strength and are far less traumatized by incarceration, interrogation, or imprisonment (Miller 2006) . In other words, they are not just normal people, but rather they are normal people with better than average fortunes. Since millions of people fit this description and the overwhelming majority of them do not resort to violence, psychological traits are insufficient to identify people with violent tendencies. In a study of a leftist group in India which resorted to violence (Sarangi and Alison 2005) , the twelve members of the group who were interviewed provided similar personal narratives in which they described structural deficiencies in their societies including corruption, oppression, and lack of empowerment for certain segments of the society. Consequently, their personal narratives painted a picture of those engaged in violence as "heroes" who are confronting these deficiencies. The findings of Sarangi and Alison (2005) are in line with the findings of many other studies that show that people who resort to violence do so to eliminate what they perceive as injustices (Plous and Zimbardo 2005) . Along the same lines, there has been a recent story that was publicized in the media concerning a man called Ahmed Al-Darawy, a successful and affluent 38 year-old former manager in a multinational company in Egypt, who was killed while fighting alongside ISIS 1 . Al-Darawy was a former police officer, who left the service to join the revolutionaries who toppled the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, and he later ran for elected office in an embrace of democracy. Interviews with his friends after his death painted a picture of a person who was disillusioned and angry, particularly after the military intervention against the democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi. Al-Darawy is highly prototypical of people who resort to violence. Juergen Todenhoefer, a German journalist who recently spent 10 days with ISIS, provided confirming testimony in which he said "These [ISIS fighters] are not stupid people. One of the people we met had just finished his law degree, he had great job offers, but he turned them down to go and fight.
2 " There is evidence in the literature that support for such militant groups is mostly political, rather than religious (Abdulla 2007) . In short, Louis (2009) attributes the motivation to pursue violent means to the following beliefs: 1) "Alternatives to terror do not work"; and 2) "Terrorism can achieve social change".
In this paper, given Arab Twitter users (tweeps) with explicitly expressed positions supporting or opposing ISIS, we seek to identify distinguishing features from their Twitter profiles that foretell their future positions prior to authoring the first tweet overtly declaring their stance. We examine the interests of both groups before and after they started explicitly supporting or opposing ISIS. In line with the findings in the literature, we attempt to analyze the motivations that prompt people to support ISIS (not necessarily join them), namely identifying perceived injustices that act as triggers.
We conducted the study on approximately 57 thousand tweeps, who authored nearly 123 million tweets. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We determine distinguishing language that signals current support or opposition for ISIS.
• We train a classifier that can predict future support or opposition of ISIS with %87 accuracy.
• We identify potential reasons for subsequent support of ISIS and the sources of opposition to the group.
• We attempt to account for the profiles of people who currently support or oppose ISIS.
• We illustrate some of the underlying phenomena in the group's social media engagement.
Our analysis is broken down into two parts. After discussing related work and describing our data collection, we first present a global trend analysis of trends in pro-vs. anti-ISIS tweets. This provides insights into the effect of external events, such as reports of territorial gains or videos of beheadings, on the mobilization of supporters. After this, we present an individual historic analysis where we put particular emphasis on the pre-ISIS period.
Background ISIS and the Syrian Conflict Online
Militant groups have long used the internet and social media for communication, information gathering, recruitment, and social network engagement (Cohen-Almagor 2012) . Though, specific literature on the use by ISIS of social media is scant, there are strong indicators that the group seems to be fairly media savvy with strong presence on different social media platforms (Shane and Hubbard 2014) . For example, ISIS (or its affiliates) maintain many Twitter accounts that propagate the group's message in several languages. When accounts are taken down, new ones are quickly created to replace them (Shane and Hubbard 2014) . ISIS also produces high quality videos in several languages as a recruitment tool. For example, the group produced an English video entitled "There is No Life Without Jihad" that featured Western fighters that behoove others to join them (Kohlmann and Alkhouri 2014) . Much of the propaganda of ISIS is focused on reporting on military successes and ISIS's success in implementing different aspect of Sharia (Islamic law). Though they were not the first to engage in this kind of (Kohlmann and Alkhouri 2014) . The effectiveness of the social media strategy of ISIS and the boost it received due to the US bombing campaign against it has been reported on in the news 3 . Though not explicitly focused on ISIS, other studies have looked at Twitter communication in Syria during the ongoing conflict. O'Callaghan et al. (2014) performed a network analysis of 652 Twitter accounts of Syrians engaged in the conflict. These accounts were identified using Twitter lists and their analysis revealed four general communities, namely: (i) pro-Assad, (ii) Kurdish, (iii) secular/moderate opposition, and (iv) Islamists, including supporters of ISIS. Their analysis, performed before the major territorial gains of ISIS, also involved content analysis of the Freebase 6 concepts assigned to YouTube videos that were uploaded by the Twitter users. Our analysis takes a different angle and tries to identify a wider range of users (57k, extracted from an initial 165k) and, importantly, tries to go back in time to un-derstand the antecedents of joining or merely supporting a particular group. Another study has investigated the reactions on Twitter in response to the 2013 Sarin Gas Attacks near Damascus (Tyshchuk et al. 2014) . Among other things, they observed that "there was no immediate polarization of opinions following the event", and that "Twitter communities were too sparse to produce substantial amount of social pressure to force an opinion/opinion shift". Finally, Morstatter et al. (Morstatter et al. 2013 ) have used geo-tagged tweets from Syria to evaluate the bias between different sources and sampling methods of Twitter data.
Using Online Data to Study Political Polarization
Our pro-vs. anti-ISIS angle can also be seen as a study of online polarization. Polarization, usually along the political left vs. right dimension, has a long research history. One quantitative approach is the NOMINATE score (Poole and Rosenthal 1985) . It uses roll call data voting history from the U.S. senate and house of representatives to can quantify the statement that U.S. politics follows a 1-dimensional left-to-right schema. Focusing on online data, polarization in U.S. politics has been studied in the setting of blogger networks (Adamic and Glance 2005) and Twitter (Conover et al. 2011) to name two influential studies. Geographically and topically closer to ISIS, online polarization and political violence has been studied using Twitter data from Egypt (Weber, Garimella, and Batayneh 2013; Borge-Holthoefer et al. 2015) . The conflict between Israel and Palestine and how it plays out on Twitter has also recently been studied (Liu and Weber 2014) . Though these studies describe differences in the users who are part of the two camps, none of these studies look at the antecedents or attempts to explain what makes a user join or support one side rather than another.
Data Collection
Since the majority of ISIS supporters come from the Arab World, we focused our study on Arabic Twitter profiles. Figure 2 illustrates the steps we followed for data collection. We first start by identifying tweets in Arabic by continuously searching the Twitter Rest API with the query "lang:ar".
7 From this set of Arabic tweets, we then collected all tweets mentioning ISIS by any of its name forms between mid October, 2014 and the end of December, 2014. The name variations were of two types, namely: those that used the full name of the group such as " " (Aldawla Alislamiya -"Islamic State") and " " (Aldawla Alislamiya fi Aliraq walsham -"Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant"), and those that used the abbreviated version of the name such as " " (da'esh -Arabic acronym for the group), , " " (da'eshy -from da'esh), and " " (dawa'esh -plural of da'eshy).
7 Using the language operator "lang:" on Twitter's Streaming API would have resulted in a dramatically reduced data set as the operator is provided on a post-sample basis, i.e., after sampling down to 1% of tweets. In all, we collected 3.1 million Arabic tweets mentioning ISIS in some form, authored by more than 250k users between Oct. 13, 2014 and Dec. 31, 2014 . This data underlies our tweet-centric analysis. From these tweets we identified 180k tweeps during the period October 13, 2014 and November 1, 2014. Of the 180k tweeps, only 165k had active accounts for which we could obtain historic tweets through the Twitter Rest API. By Nov. 17, 2014, the remaining 15k accounts were either deleted by the user, suspended by Twitter, or had their privacy settings set changed to "protected".
Next, we were interested in distinguishing between those who support and those who oppose ISIS. We found that the name used to refer to the group was telling of whether a person supports or opposes them. A native Arabic speaker, who is well acquainted with the topic, judged a random sample of 1,000 tweets that was spread uniformly across all days for each condition as positive, negative, or neutral. Positive tweets included ones that praise the group, spreads their messages, or report on them positively. Negative tweets include ones that attack the group and spreads negative news about them. Neutral ones included those that merely report news or spam tweets that use ISIS related hashtags to increase their exposure. Table 1 presents the percentage of tweets that support or oppose ISIS based on whether they use; a) the full name (or its variants); or b) the abbreviated name (or its variants). As shown, using the full name of group is a strong indicator of support for ISIS (93%), and using the acronyms is a general indication of opposition (77%). For the 23% of tweets that use the acronym, 7.5% support ISIS and 15% do not reveal any specific leaning. The fact that both pro-and anti-ISIS tweeps carefully choose how they refer to ISIS has been observed by others before 8 . Based on the observation that using the full name mostly indicates support and the ab-Search query Anti-ISIS Pro-ISIS Neutral/Spam "ISIS" 77.3% 7.5% 15.2% "Islamic State"
1.2% 93.1% 5.7% Table 1 : Percentage of pro-/anti-ISIS tweets given the presence of either an abbreviated form ("ISIS") or the full name ("Islamic State") breviated name generally indicates opposition, out of the 3.1 million tweets that we collected, 1.2 million and 1.8 million tweets were supporting and opposing ISIS respectively. For all tweeps, we scraped the last 3,200 tweets that they authored, totaling 324 million tweets, along with other Twitter profile information such as profile creation date and user declared location.
From the full set of tweeps, we retained 56,960 who: 1) authored 10 or more tweets (out of 3,200 tweets) that mention ISIS, and 2) strictly used either the long name or strictly used the abbreviated name of ISIS in at least 70% of their tweets that mention the group.
These two conditions were meant to ensure that we perform our study on tweeps who are both engaged in the topic and have voiced clear positions towards ISIS. To validate the definiteness of user positions (pro-or anti-ISIS) based on the two conditions, we had the same judge automatically label 50 random tweeps from each group. The judge labeled tweeps as pro-or anti-ISIS based on the tweets that they authored mentioning the group. We found that all 100 tweeps were correctly labeled, which suggests that the conditions yield high labeling precision. Through this, we automatically labeled 11,332 users as pro-ISIS and 45,628 users as anti-ISIS. The tweeps meeting these conditions authored 123 million (out 324 million we collected).
Pro/Anti ISIS Tweet Counts and Temporal Trends
In this section, we explore the temporal tweeting trends for those who support or oppose ISIS. We attempt to correlate these trends with events that happened during the period of study. Figure 3 shows the tweet counts for both groups from Oct. 13, 2014 to Dec. 31, 2014 . Figure 3 shows the relative percentages of pro-and anti-ISIS tweets. The counts for both groups are weakly correlated with a Pearson's r of 0.27. Pearson's r ranges between -1 (complete negative correlation) and 1 (complete positive correlation) and 0 implies no correlation. As can be seen, the fraction of pro-ISIS tweets steadily increased over the time period, while anti-ISIS tweets has steadily decreased. However, it is not clear if the increase in pro-ISIS tweets is organic or not. Figure 3 lists some of the major news stories that appeared on the days when there were peaks for ISIS supporters and opposers. As can be seen from the events, anti-ISIS tweets generally peaked when news of ISIS human rights violations emerged such as the killing of hostage, accounts of torture, or reports of the enslavement of Yazidi women. On the other hand, pro-ISIS tweets generally peaked in conjunction with the release of propaganda videos and major military achievements. Though some connection between events on the ground and shifts in the relative popularity can be observed, it is not clear how strong it is, and it is very hard to determine causality. Figure 4 shows the top 15 peaking hashtags in association with pro-and anti-ISIS tweets, along with their frequency counts. To obtain the top hashtags, we: a) extracted the hashtags from the original set of 3.1 million tweets; b) eliminated hashtags that are name variants of ISIS; c) we obtained and sorted hashtag-per-day counts; and d) we retained the top 15 that had the highest hashtag-per-day counts (and not the global count over the entire period). In other words, if a hashtag was used 1,000 times in one day, it would be preferred over another that was used about 100 times everyday for 20 days.
The upper part of Figure 4 shows the top 15 hashtags (translated from Arabic) used by pro-ISIS tweeps cover a variety of topics such as (each hashtag is followed by its rank): threats and claims of victory against opponents as in #ISIS to liberate KSA (1), #ISIS ousts US sectary of defense (7), and #killing of Battat (a Shia cleric who opposed them); media organizations #Furqan Foundation (2) and #Itisam Foundation (12); media releases as in #de-spite the disbelievers (3) and #spreading his CV (referring to the leader of ISIS) (8); spreading news of battles and areas under their control as in #Sinai State (6), #Alkhair State (9), #Ein Islam (ISIS's name of Kobani) (13), and #Ramady (15); and the most interesting of them is using popular hashtags, even ones used by their opponents, to spread their message as in #we are all Moaz (the pilot of the Jordanian plane that ISIS downed) (5) and #Helal Sydney (refers to a soccer match) (14).
The top 15 hashtags (translated from Arabic) used by anti-ISIS tweeps cover: exposure of their violence as in #ISIS stones woman (1), #torturing women (10), #Syd-ney hostages (8), and #Ahsaa shooting (11); using ISIS as a negative label for other groups as in #MB UK (Muslim Brotherhood, United Kingdom) (2); virtual and physical threats against ISIS as in #banning ISIS on Twitter (5) and #Egypt cemetary for ISIS (9); using pro-ISIS hashtags to attack the group as in #KSA army rule (4) and #Kurds are Jewish slaves (12); and attacking their sympathizers and leaders as in #Naef Elthaqafi (13) and #Abu Bakr Baghdadi (15) respectively.
Some of the top hashtags used by by pro-and anti-ISIS tweeps seem to be consistent with news stories that appeared on the days when pro-and anti-ISIS tweet-counts peaked respectively. It seems that the top interests of both groups are rather different, except for one incident when an ISIS affiliate group attacked the Egyptian Army in Sinai, leading to the hashtags #Sinai State and #Egypt cemetary for ISIS for the pro-and anti-ISIS tweeps respectively. There has been discussion in the media about the brutal tactics of ISIS 9 . Our observations suggest that they seem to galvanize opposition against them, and it is unclear if it is an effective recruitment tool.
Classifying and Analyzing Pro/Anti ISIS Tweeps Classifying Tweeps
Given the users we have identified as being most likely supporting or opposing ISIS based on the whether they refer to ISIS (# ) or the Islamic State (# ), we were interested in classifying users as potentially supporting or opposing ISIS before they explicitly wrote a tweet identifying their stance. As mentioned earlier, we automatically labeled 11,332 and 45,628 tweeps as supporting or opposing ISIS. Of 11,332 supporting tweeps, 4,307 of them indicated support for ISIS starting from the creation dates. Thus, we could not use them for prediction, and we were left with 7,225 tweeps. For balance during classification, we randomly picked an equal number of anti-ISIS tweeps whose accounts were active prior to their opposition to ISIS. We used the tweeps with the tweets they authored prior to the first supporting/opposing tweets for classification. We rancruickshank-storer-hamid-bakos-isis/ domly selected 10% of the tweeps for validation, and we performed 10-fold cross-validation on the remaining 90%. For classification, we trained a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier using the SVM Light implementation with a linear kernel with default parameters. For features, we used bagof-words features, including individual terms, hashtags and user mentions. The Arabic text of the tweets was processed using the method described by Darwish et al. (2012) to normalize the text and to handle word elongations. We combined all the tweets for a single user into one document, and we used all the tokens in the combined-tweets documents as features. We used the validation set to perform SVM threshold adjustment. The threshold was adjusted to maximize the classification effectiveness (F1 score). Table 2 lists classification results of potential supporters and opposers of ISIS based on the tweets they authored prior to their first tweet explicitly stating their position. As results show, both groups are quite separable from each other, even before they voice explicit support or opposition, and the classifier can distinguish between them with relatively high accuracy.
Next, we were interested in understanding the underlying features that makes the two groups separable. So, we consulted the SVM classification model to identify the most distinguishing 50 hashtags that the classifier used to determine We opted to use hashtags instead of individual word for this exploration, because they are more demonstrative of underlying topics. Figure 5 shows tag clouds for the hashtags for future pro-and anti-ISIS users in the before condition. The size of each hashtag in the cloud is indicative of its weight as assigned by the classifier. By examining the top 50 hashtags that are most indicative of future ISIS support, we observe the following (each hashtag is followed by its rank on the list):
• Most hashtags are political and are specifically related to support of the Arab Spring and opposition to regional regimes. These hashtags by country are as follows (translated to English): -Egypt: #elect the pimp (4 -hashtag referring Sisi that emerged during the Egyptian presidential elections), #Morsi (7 -ousted Egyptian president), #Rami Lakkah (13 -Egyptian politician and businessman), #Ra-bia Adawiyya (29 -sit-in that was disbanded violently by security forces), #Rabia (35), #the free 25 (47 -referring to Jan. 25 uprising) -Saudi Arabia: #Alburayda sit-in (5), #Saud clan (9 -Saudi rulers), #the people say their word (18) (41) . This is in line with previous research that shows that imprisonment and torture seem to "fan the flames" of violence (Bellamy 2009 ).
• Only three hashtag is indicative of anything religious namely #tweet Islamic (16), #Islam (34), and #remem-brance (49) • One interesting hashtag was #a million atheist Arabs that was used for discussions with atheists. In short, most of the hashtags are related to support for the Arab Spring, opposition to existing regimes in the Middle East, solidarity or concern over hotspots in the Muslim worlds, and disillusionment with the current status quo.
As for the top 50 hashtags that are most indicative of future opposition to ISIS, we observe that:
• Most of the tweets are general like the one about an exhibition in Abu Dhabi (1) Whereas the previous analysis was done on classifiers built before users expressed support or opposition to ISIS, we also built a separate SVM classifier exclusively using data after they expressed their opinion. Though this does not directly reveal anything about the antecedents of support, it still helps paint a clearer picture on how the supporters differ from the opposition. For this analysis, tweets containing a reference to ISIS were ignored as, trivially, otherwise the corresponding hashtags would have been the most discriminating features. Figure 5 in the after condition shows tag clouds for the most distinguishing hashtags for current pro-and anti-ISIS users respectively. Again, we obtained the hashtags from the SVM classification model. (14) and #Brotherhood of Syria and ISIS as in #khawarej (37 -a deviant sect in Islamic history) and #Baghdadi (42 -leader of ISIS).
3) opposition to regimes that are perceived to support Islamic groups such as #Zaman Arabic (5 -opposition publication in Turkey) and #why oh Qatar (19) • The third theme seem to be Shia related as in #Hus-sein lives on (34 -revered Shia historical figure).
Example Tweets and Tweeps
To provide a better qualitative understanding of our data set, we provide some pairs of before/after tweets for ISIS supporters (Table 3 ) and ISIS opposition (Table 4) . Among the ISIS supporters, tweep T1 seemingly supported the 2011 Egyptian revolution and is probably not an Islamist. Tweep T3 opposed the military coup in Egypt. Tweeps T2 and T5 supported different militant groups in Syria and ended up supporting ISIS. In the case of tweep T5, he transitioned from supporting to opposing the Free Syrian Army. Tweep T4 was a supporter of the 2011 Libyan revolution.
Among the ISIS opposition, tweeps T6, T7, and T8 supported different Muslim rebel groups in Syria and ended up opposing ISIS. Tweep T9 supports the current Egyptian regime and opposes the Muslim Brotherhood. Tweep T10 is seemingly a Shia fighting against ISIS.
Geographic Distribution of Tweeps
Apart from what users tweets, their geographic location is also expected to be related to whether they are more likely to support or oppose ISIS. To test whether there is indeed geographic variation in patterns of support and opposition we used the users' self-declared locations to map them to countries. For the users labeled as anti-ISIS, 46% had provided a non-empty location string in their profile. This fraction was only 21% for those labeled as pro-ISIS. We then matched the user declared locations to a dataset containing country ID's for the 10,000 most commonly used Arabic user locations from a large set of tweets (Mubarak and Darwish 2014 If a location is ambiguous, ex. refers to multiple countries such as "UK and Syria", then it was ignored. To further increase the recall of mapped locations, we also used Yahoo Placemaker 10 . Manual inspection showed that this tool worked well for strings in European languages, but it performed poorly for most Arabic strings. Hence, we decided to only pass strings with letters in the Latin alphabet to Yahoo Placemaker. As for annotation, strings where multiple countries were detected were ignored. Using this procedure, we managed to map 52% of non-empty locations for anti-ISIS tweeps and 21% for pro-ISIS tweeps. This means that 24% of the anti-ISIS tweeps could be mapped to a country, compared to 4.4% for pro-ISIS tweeps. The number of countrylabeled pro-ISIS tweeps is rather small, so any further statistics on them are likely inconclusive. As one might expect, tweeps in the pro-ISIS group are less likely to put real nonempty locations, potentially due to fear of being prosecuted. Their declared locations are generally nondescript such as "in the wide world". Table 5 shows the count of countries that we were able to map tweeps to.
Though large countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 10 https://developer.yahoo.com/yql/console/#, then geo.placemaker.
Pro-ISIS
Anti-ISIS Saudi Arabia (144) Saudi Arabia (4,675) Iraq (56) Kuwait (1,064) Syria (49) Egypt (1,060) Egypt (39) UAE (753) Kuwait (15) Iraq (474) Qatar (13) Bahrain (429) Yemen (12) United Kingdom (392) Jordan (12) Lebanon (321) Libya (10) Qatar (255) Algeria (9) Syria (183) Only countries with at least 10 mapped pro-ISIS users were used for this analysis. Still, the analysis is ultimately based on a fairly small number of pro-ISIS users and should be more viewed as a proof-of-concept analysis.
Focus and Time Analysis of Tweeps
In this section we examine how often pro-and anti-ISIS tweeps tweet about ISIS and the typical creation of their Twitter account. Figure 6 shows the distribution of ISIS related tweets for both groups. As can be observed, though the number of pro-ISIS tweeps is significantly smaller than anti-ISIS tweeps, pro-ISIS tweeps dedicate a much large portion of the their tweeting activity to ISIS. On average pro-ISIS tweeps tweet about ISIS 20% of the time compared to 4.5% of the time for anti-ISIS tweeps. As for when the Twitter accounts were created, Figure 7 provides the distribution of creation dates for both groups. Concerning the anti-ISIS group, there are two major spikes. The first is in late 2011/early 2012, which is probably caused by the Arab Spring. The second one that appears in mid 2014 looks interesting and we cannot readily explain it. More investigation of this is required. For pro-ISIS tweeps, nearly 32% of them joined Twitter in September and October 2014. This spike coincides with the commencement of the US bombing campaign against ISIS. However, other factors maybe at play and this requires further investigation.
Limitations
Though our study is closely related to studies understanding the psychology of militants and their supporters, our focus in this paper is on ideological supporters, not the actual fighters on the ground. In a sense, we are looking more at the "soil" on which violent behavior can flourish. We believe that such a broader view is crucial to finding solutions that go beyond the identification and elimination of individuals.
One of the strengths of our study is that we look at tweets in Arabic, whereas social media studies in general tend to be English-only and US-centric. Most ISIS members are after all Arabs. However, this also means that our studies does not include any recruiting attempts or press-release-type mes- Studying such marketing efforts would be interesting in its own right, but deviates from the motivation of our study to understand the antecedents of ISIS support. Our data collection involved using both the Twitter Streaming API and, after identifying tweets and users of interest, the Twitter REST API to obtain historic information. However, due to the temporal difference of when these two data sets where collected, some accounts had been deleted by the user, had their privacy settings changed to "protected" or were suspended by Twitter by the time we collected the historic data. There has been media reports that suggest that Twitter frequently suspends ISIS related accounts (Shane and Hubbard 2014) . Concretely we failed to get the data for nearly 15 thousand out of 180 thousand tweeps, meaning that our data set is probably biased towards less offensive and less openly hateful users. Despite this shortcoming, our classification results shows that even this set of "slightly more politically correct" users could be easily told apart. Slightly less dramatic than the deletion or suspension of complete accounts, users themselves can delete individual tweets. So if an ISIS supporter was now embarrassed by posting about Britney Spears several years ago, he could go back and delete these tweets. Though a theoretical possibility, we do not expect this kind of behavior to be frequent. A more frequent limitation is the result of Twitter's restriction which only provides up to the most recent 3,200 tweets for a user. Hence, for more active users we could not go back in their history as much as we would have liked.
Needless to say that Twitter users are not necessarily representative of the general population. But especially in these domains surveys would also suffer from non-response bias as many people might prefer not to openly voice their support for a militant organization. In that sense Twitter with its perceived anonymity lends itself to study such phenomena. The fact that our findings concerning the frustration with failed Arab Spring revolutions are in line with previous research (Kohlmann and Alkhouri 2014; Plous and Zimbardo 2005) also suggests that our results are not mere artifacts of a user selection bias.
The representativeness of our study could potentially be improved by broadening the user base by inferring a users likelihood to support or oppose ISIS. Classification could use a mix of content and network features and, unlike our current classifier, be applied to users for which the ground truth is not known and might never express their opinion on the topic. Of course, attempting to read the minds of the "silent majority" is notoriously difficult (Cohen and Ruths 2013) .
Our definition of the "before" period could also be seen as a limitation. As the cut-off date between the "before" and "after" period is different for each user and depends on the date of their first on-topic tweet, it is hard to generalize to the population level. This also relates to the possibility that the temporal dynamics are likely to change over time and that the early supporters might differ from the supporters joining later. The fact that our classifier achieves such good performance suggests though that there are not too many temporal subgroups with vastly different characteristics, though this could be investigated in future work.
Conclusion
In this paper, we used Twitter data to study the antecedents of ISIS support. At a global, temporal level, we observed some connection between spikes in support or opposition and reports of territorial gains/losses or accounts of torture, forced female enslavement, and similar news. The clearest trend, however, was that ISIS supporters seemed to join Twitter just for the purpose of voicing their support, as could be seen both from temporal concentration, as well as their topical focus on the matter. At a personal, historic level, we managed to predict future support or opposition of ISIS with 87% accuracy, using only tweets from the pre-ISIS period. Looking at discriminating hashtags suggested that a major source of support for ISIS stems from frustration with the missteps of the Arab Spring. As for opposition to ISIS, it is linked with support for other rebel groups, mostly in Syria, that have been targeted by ISIS, support for existing Middle Eastern regimes, and Shia sectarianism. We also showed some of the interesting geographical and temporal trends for both pro-and anti-ISIS tweeps.
